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Abstract 
The US private pension system is at a crossroads. Its future direction is now under intense scrutiny by 
Congress, which has recently considered two very different proposals for change, each containing 
elements likely to be on the national agenda for some time. One approach embodies a traditional 
approach to pension reform, with an omnibus statute that tinkers with almost every aspect of the private 
pension system to make incremental changes. A second seeks to bring radical change and simplification, 
with sweeping consolidation of the number and types of defined contribution plans. This chapter 
evaluates these two approaches, one for incremental change, the other for structural reform, and then 
considers an alternative. Our analysis focuses on the nuts-and-bolts of the private pension system, the 
plans that comprise it, and the rules that govern them that have accumulated over the past 60 years. Our 
thesis is that an analysis of the architecture and machinery of the private pension system can teach us a 
great deal about how to redesign the private pension system to meet retirement income challenges to 
come. 
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Chapter 3
Reality Testing for Pension Reform
Pamela Perun and C. Eugene Steuerle
I’m staring at documents that make no sense to me, no matter how many
beers I drink. . . . Apparently I have until Sept. 30 (in most instances) . . . to
comply with something (but what?) called ‘GUST’ . . . [for my Keogh plan and
I] . . . must adopt EGTRRA prior to the end of the plan year beginning in
2002. I am, frankly, reluctant to adopt anything called ‘EGTRRA,’ which
sounds like the name of a giant radioactive chicken that destroys Tokyo . . . the
federal Tax Code is out of control. . . . It’s gigantic and insanely complex, and
it gets worse all the time. Nobody has ever read the whole thing. IRS workers
are afraid to go into the same ROOM with it. They keep it locked in the
basement, and once a day, they open the door, heave in a live taxpayer—some
poor slob who failed to adopt EGTRRA in time to comply with GUST (and
various other amendments)—then slam the door shut, before the screams
start (Barry, 2003).
As humorist Dave Barry has pointed out, the US private pension system is fair
game for jokes and ridicule. It is absurdly complicated and incomprehen-
sible. Relevant tax rules and regulations include more than 3,000 pages of
small, single-spaced, text and weigh more than most laptop computers. The
companion labor rules under the Employee Retirement Income Security
Act (ERISA) of 1974, are smaller, but not by much. There is widespread
agreement that the present situation is untenable and something must be
done. There is also widespread recognition that the aging of the baby boom
generation will place the US private pension system under unprecedented
pressure and that a comprehensive review of pension policy is long overdue
(Mulvey and Nyce Chapter 7). As Klein (Chapter 2) notes, reinventing
the retirement paradigm requires examining whether the current US pri-
vate pension system can meet the retirement income challenges to come.
Analyses of the US private pension system typically focus on such issues as
how to improve coverage or encourage saving or prevent tax abuse or
generate retirement income more equitably. Those issues are important,
but this chapter takes the position that reinventing the retirement para-
digm will require more fundamental analysis. A critical step in the analysis
is to step back and examine closely the architecture of the private pension
system today. The structure and machinery of the private pension system,
that is, the accumulation of plan types and rules over the past sixty years,
have much to teach us about directions for reform. Accordingly we focus
on the nuts-and-bolts of the private pension system, the plans that comprise
it and the rules that govern them.
This is an opportune time for such an analysis. For perhaps the first time,
there are two very different types of proposals for change before Congress.
The first is reflected in the Pension Preservation and Savings Expansion Act
(PPSEA) introduced in 2003 by Representatives Portman and Cardin (Port-
man and Cardin 2003a, 2003b). PPSEA is the ‘traditional’ type of pension
reform, an omnibus bill that tinkers with almost every aspect of the private
pension system to make incremental changes. The second proposal is the
attempt of the Administration to effect radical change and simplification in
the structure of the private pension system. The 2003 proposal, modified
in budget submissions in 2004; contemplates a sweeping consolidation in
the number and types of defined contribution (DC) plans (Purcell 2003;
US Department of the Treasury 2004). This chapter evaluates these two
approaches to change; the first one for incremental change, and the
second one involving greater structural reform, and then it considers
an alternative.
The Current Structure of the US Pension System
As a starting point, it is helpful to take an overview look at the current
structure of the private pension system in the USA. Most people under-
stand that the system is composed of defined benefit (DB) and DC plans,
but few are aware that, legally speaking, there can be as much diversity
within these types of plans as between them. Figure 3-1 illustrates the
extraordinary constellation of plans that will be available when all changes
brought about by Economic Growth and Tax Relief Reconciliation Act
(EGTTRA) of 2001, the most recent major pension reform law, have
become fully operational in 2006 (see Glossary for terminology).
The US private pension system evolved into its current complicated
structure as the result of two primary factors. First, it is a tax-based system
that provides tax incentives to promote saving for retirement. Second, it is a
voluntary employer-based system: employers are encouraged, but not re-
quired, to provide plans for their employees. In this framework, different
types of employers are subject to different tax rules. For example, for-profit
and not-for-profit employers are subject to completely different sections of
the federal tax code, while governmental employers are largely exempt
from such rules. The theory has been that, if pension plans are to be
sponsored by different types of employers, those plans should be subject
to as many different rules as are necessary and appropriate for those
employers. This emphasis on the tax attributes of employers largely ex-
plains the historical evolution of the private pension system. It began in the
1920s with special tax rules for plans sponsored by corporate employers.
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Some twenty years later, new types of plans for not-for-profit employers
were created. Next, special plans for self-employed individuals were devel-
oped, and then rules were imposed on plans for governmental employers.
With the passage of ERISA, individual retirement accounts or IRAs were
created, almost as an afterthought, to give workers without an employer-
sponsored plan a limited opportunity to save for retirement. Finally, special
Savings Incentive Match Plan for Employees (SIMPLE) plans have recently
been created in the hope of attracting small employers to the private
pension system. These are DC plans with safe harbor provisions designed
to reduce the regulatory requirements of sponsoring a plan to a minimum.
The historical evolution of the private pension system is reflected in the
post-EGTTRA arrangement of plan types composed of three primary fam-
ilies of plans. The largest group consists of qualified DB and DC plans
subject to IRC § 401(a) that are subject to the full panoply of tax and
ERISA rules. Although these plans were originally developed for corporate
employers, now, with a few exceptions, any employer can sponsor these
types of plans. The second group consists of tax sheltered annuities
that must satisfy IRC § 403(b). These plans continue to be limited to
nonprofit employers and public educational institutions. As might be
expected, these plans are subject to much less regulation than their
401(a) counterparts. The third group consists of IRA-based plans under
IRC § 408. Although IRAs were originally intended to be substitute savings
plans for individuals without an employer-sponsored plan, employers can
now offer group plans using these accounts. These plans are designed to
minimize the regulatory burden on employers. Finally, there is a small,
special category of plans available largely to governmental employers
under IRC § 457(b).
Although each family of plans has its own specific rules, there has been
some convergence over time. For example, most of the special rules for
plans available to the self-employed have been repealed, and IRA-
based plans are now available to employers as well as employees. In
addition, some of the rigid barriers between plan families have been
relaxed. Both nonprofit and corporate employers may sponsor 401(k)
plans although governmental employers may not. This convergence, how-
ever, has not resulted in much simplification because, in most respects, the
plan families retain their historical structures and traditional rules. As the
pension system evolves, special rules and exceptions are created when the
traditional rules do not fit a new situation. Over time, this process has
produced a vast and complex array of rules that are increasingly difficult
to navigate, even by the most experienced legal practitioner. These rules,
which are illustrated in Table 3-1, include the EGTTRA changes that
became effective in 2004.
As the US private pension system has grown more complex, both em-
ployers and workers find it more difficult and more expensive to navigate.
28 Pamela Perun and C. Eugene Steuerle
T
a
b
le
3-
1
R
u
le
s
o
f
th
e
U
S
P
ri
va
te
P
en
si
o
n
Sy
st
em
in
20
04
IR
C
§
4
0
1
(a
)
P
la
n
s
IR
C
§
4
0
3
(b
)
A
rr
an
ge
m
en
ts
D
ef
in
ed
be
n
ef
it
(D
B
)
M
on
ey
pu
rc
ha
se
P
ro
fi
t-
sh
ar
in
g,
st
oc
k
bo
n
u
s,
St
an
da
rd
4
0
1
(k
)
P
ro
fi
t-
sh
ar
in
g,
st
oc
k
bo
n
u
s,
SI
M
P
L
E
4
0
1
(k
)
O
th
er
P
ro
fi
t-
sh
ar
in
g
or
st
oc
k
bo
n
u
s
w
it
h
n
o
4
0
1
(k
)
E
m
pl
oy
ee
st
oc
k
ow
n
er
sh
ip
pl
an
(E
SO
P
)
IR
C
§
4
0
3
(b
)
E
li
gi
b
le
em
p
lo
ye
r
A
n
y
em
p
lo
ye
r
A
n
y
em
p
lo
ye
r
ex
ce
p
t
st
at
e
&
lo
ca
l
go
ve
rn
m
en
ts
40
1(
k)
el
ig
ib
le
em
p
lo
ye
r
w
it
h
<
10
0
em
p
lo
ye
es
an
d
n
o
o
th
er
p
la
n
A
n
y
em
p
lo
ye
r
C
o
rp
o
ra
te
em
p
lo
ye
r
T
ax
-e
xe
m
p
t
o
rg
an
iz
at
io
n
s
an
d
p
u
b
li
c
sc
h
o
o
ls
O
ve
ra
ll
an
n
u
al
li
m
it
s
A
n
n
u
al
b
en
ef
it
li
m
it
,
p
er
p
er
so
n
,
is
th
e
le
ss
er
o
f
$1
65
,0
00
*
o
r
10
0%

th
e
h
ig
h
es
t
3
ye
ar
s’
p
ay
A
n
n
u
al
co
n
tr
ib
u
ti
o
n
li
m
it
,p
er
p
er
so
n
,i
s
th
e
le
ss
er
o
f
$4
1,
00
0
a
*
o
r
10
0%
o
f
p
ay
P
er
p
er
so
n
,
sa
m
e
as
m
o
n
ey
p
u
rc
h
as
e
þ
40
1(
k)
co
n
tr
ib
u
ti
o
n
s
u
p
to
a
m
ax
im
u
m
o
f
$1
3,
00
0*
A
n
n
u
al
co
n
tr
ib
u
ti
o
n
li
m
it
,p
er
p
er
so
n
,i
s
a
40
1(
k
)
co
n
tr
ib
u
ti
o
n
u
p
to
a
m
ax
im
u
m
o
f
$9
,0
00
*
þ
th
e
em
p
lo
ye
r
co
n
tr
ib
u
ti
o
n
Sa
m
e
as
m
o
n
ey
p
u
rc
h
as
e
P
ay
li
m
it
$2
05
,0
00
*
R
eq
u
ir
ed
em
p
lo
ye
r
co
n
tr
ib
u
ti
o
n
A
m
o
u
n
t
fo
r
fu
n
d
in
g
cu
rr
en
t
þ
p
as
t
se
rv
ic
e
co
st
s
fo
r
ea
ch
em
p
lo
ye
e
o
ve
r
fu
tu
re
se
rv
ic
e
O
R
th
e
n
o
rm
al
co
st
s
o
f
th
e
p
la
n
þ
p
as
t
se
rv
ic
e
li
ab
il
it
y
am
o
rt
iz
ed
o
ve
r
10
ye
ar
s
A
m
o
u
n
t
re
q
u
ir
ed
b
y
p
la
n
fo
rm
u
la
N
o
n
e
E
m
p
lo
ye
r
m
at
ch
in
g
co
n
tr
ib
u
ti
o
n
u
p
to
3%
o
f
p
ay
o
r
fi
xe
d
2%
o
f
p
ay
co
n
tr
ib
u
ti
o
n
N
o
n
e,
u
su
al
ly
(C
on
ti
n
u
ed
)
T
a
b
le
3-
1
C
on
ti
n
u
ed
.
IR
C
§
4
0
1
(a
)
P
la
n
s
IR
C
§
4
0
3
(b
)
A
rr
an
ge
m
en
ts
D
ef
in
ed
be
n
ef
it
(D
B
)
M
on
ey
pu
rc
ha
se
P
ro
fi
t-
sh
ar
in
g,
st
oc
k
bo
n
u
s,
St
an
da
rd
4
0
1
(k
)
P
ro
fi
t-
sh
ar
in
g,
st
oc
k
bo
n
u
s,
SI
M
P
L
E
4
0
1
(k
)
O
th
er
P
ro
fi
t-
sh
ar
in
g
or
st
oc
k
bo
n
u
s
w
it
h
n
o
4
0
1
(k
)
E
m
pl
oy
ee
st
oc
k
ow
n
er
sh
ip
pl
an
(E
SO
P
)
IR
C
§
4
0
3
(b
)
E
m
p
lo
ye
e
co
n
tr
ib
u
ti
o
n
li
m
it
s
A
m
o
u
n
t
re
q
u
ir
ed
b
y
p
la
n
fo
rm
u
la
,
if
an
y
N
o
t
p
er
m
it
te
d
M
ax
im
u
m
co
n
tr
ib
u
ti
o
n
o
f
$1
3,
00
0*
þ
$3
,0
00
*
ca
tc
h
-u
p
co
n
tr
ib
u
ti
o
n
if
o
r
ag
e
50
þ
M
ax
im
u
m
co
n
tr
ib
u
ti
o
n
o
f
$9
,0
00
*
þ
$1
,5
00
*
ca
tc
h
-u
p
co
n
tr
ib
u
ti
o
n
if
ag
e
50
þ
N
o
t
p
er
m
it
te
d
N
o
n
e,
u
su
al
ly
Sa
m
e
as
st
an
d
ar
d
40
1(
k)
E
m
p
lo
ye
r
d
ed
u
ct
io
n
li
m
it
s
L
es
se
r
o
f
16
5%
o
f
cu
rr
en
t
li
ab
il
it
y
o
r
ac
cr
u
ed
li
ab
il
it
y
m
in
u
s
le
ss
er
o
f
va
lu
e
o
f
p
la
n
as
se
ts
o
r
th
ei
r
ac
tu
ar
ia
l
va
lu
e
25
%
o
f
ag
gr
eg
at
e
em
p
lo
ye
e
p
ay
25
%
o
f
ag
gr
eg
at
e
em
p
lo
ye
e
p
ay
(e
xc
lu
d
in
g
40
1(
k)
co
n
tr
ib
u
ti
o
n
s)
G
re
at
er
o
f
co
n
tr
ib
u
ti
o
n
s
(e
xc
lu
d
in
g
40
1(
k)
co
n
tr
ib
u
ti
o
n
s)
u
p
to
25
%
o
f
ag
gr
eg
at
e
em
p
lo
ye
e
p
ay
o
r
re
q
u
ir
ed
co
n
tr
ib
u
ti
o
n
Sa
m
e
as
m
o
n
ey
p
u
rc
h
as
e
Sa
m
e
as
m
o
n
ey
p
u
rc
h
as
e
þ
ce
rt
ai
n
d
iv
id
en
d
s
an
d
in
te
re
st
o
n
an
y
lo
an
N
o
t
ap
p
li
ca
b
le
E
x
cl
u
si
o
n
s
fr
o
m
so
ci
al
se
cu
ri
ty
ta
x
B
o
th
co
n
tr
ib
u
ti
o
n
s
an
d
d
is
tr
ib
u
ti
o
n
s
N
o
t
fo
r
40
1(
k)
co
n
tr
ib
u
ti
o
n
s
b
u
t
o
th
er
co
n
tr
ib
u
ti
o
n
s
an
d
al
l
d
is
tr
ib
u
ti
o
n
s
q
u
al
if
y
Ye
s
Ye
s
N
o
t
fo
r
em
p
lo
ye
e
co
n
tr
ib
u
ti
o
n
s
b
u
t
em
p
lo
ye
r
co
n
tr
ib
u
ti
o
n
s
an
d
al
l
d
is
tr
ib
u
ti
o
n
s
q
u
al
if
y
1
0
%
E
ar
ly
w
it
h
d
ra
w
al
ta
x
Ye
s
In
-s
er
vi
ce
w
it
h
d
ra
w
al
s
N
o
t
p
er
m
it
te
d
F
in
an
ci
al
h
ar
d
sh
ip
b
,
m
in
im
u
m
2
ye
ar
h
o
ld
in
g
p
er
io
d
fo
r
em
p
lo
ye
r
co
n
tr
ib
u
ti
o
n
s,
lo
an
s
M
in
im
u
m
2
ye
ar
h
o
ld
in
g
p
er
io
d
,
lo
an
s
F
in
an
ci
al
h
ar
d
sh
ip
,
lo
an
s
N
o
n
d
is
cr
im
in
at
io
n
ru
le
s
(n
o
t
go
ve
rn
m
en
ta
l
p
la
n
s)
T
o
p
-h
ea
vy
,
co
ve
ra
ge
an
d
n
o
n
-d
is
cr
im
in
at
io
n
ru
le
s
A
D
P
,
A
C
P
,
to
p
-h
ea
vy
,
co
ve
ra
ge
an
d
n
o
n
-
d
is
cr
im
in
at
io
n
ru
le
sc
C
an
b
e
ex
em
p
t
fr
o
m
to
p
-h
ea
vy
ru
le
s;
n
o
A
D
P
,
A
C
P
o
r
n
o
n
-
d
is
cr
im
in
at
io
n
ru
le
s
T
o
p
-h
ea
vy
,
co
ve
ra
ge
an
d
n
o
n
-d
is
cr
im
in
at
io
n
ru
le
s
A
C
P
fo
r
m
at
ch
in
g
co
n
tr
ib
u
ti
o
n
s,
av
ai
la
b
il
it
y
te
st
fo
r
d
ef
er
ra
ls
an
d
n
o
n
d
is
cr
im
in
at
io
n
ru
le
s
In
te
gr
at
ed
w
it
h
so
ci
al
se
cu
ri
ty
M
ay
b
e
M
ay
b
e
(n
o
t
40
1(
k)
co
n
tr
ib
u
ti
o
n
s
o
r
m
at
ch
in
g
co
n
tr
ib
u
ti
o
n
s)
N
o
M
ay
b
e
N
o
M
ay
b
e
S
p
o
u
sa
l
p
ro
te
ct
io
n
Su
rv
iv
o
r
an
n
u
it
y,
co
n
se
n
t
an
d
d
ea
th
b
en
ef
it
ri
gh
ts
O
n
ly
d
ea
th
b
en
ef
it
u
su
al
ly
d
V
es
ti
n
g
D
ef
er
re
d
Im
m
ed
ia
te
fo
r
40
1(
k)
co
n
tr
ib
u
ti
o
n
s;
al
l
o
th
er
s
d
ef
er
re
d
Im
m
ed
ia
te
D
ef
er
re
d
Im
m
ed
ia
te
fo
r
d
ef
er
ra
ls
;
o
th
er
s
d
ef
er
re
d
S
p
ec
ia
l
re
q
u
ir
em
en
ts
P
B
G
C
gu
ar
an
te
e
an
d
p
re
m
iu
m
o
f
$1
9
p
er
p
ar
ti
ci
p
an
t
M
in
im
u
m
fu
n
d
in
g
re
q
u
ir
ed
in
fu
ll
ea
ch
ye
ar
Sp
ec
ia
l
ve
st
in
g
ru
le
s
fo
r
m
at
ch
in
g
co
n
tr
ib
u
ti
o
n
s
N
o
n
e
F
o
rf
ei
tu
re
s/
in
te
re
st
p
ay
m
en
ts
ra
is
e
an
n
u
al
co
n
tr
ib
u
ti
o
n
li
m
it
if
1/
3
o
f
co
n
tr
ib
u
ti
o
n
s
ar
e
fo
r
H
C
E
s;
10
0%
em
p
lo
ye
r
se
cu
ri
ti
es
al
lo
w
ed
;
d
iv
er
si
fi
ca
ti
o
n
o
p
ti
o
n
al
at
55
;
p
u
t
o
p
ti
o
n
/
vo
ti
n
g
ri
gh
ts
.
Sp
ec
ia
l
ca
tc
h
-u
p
co
n
tr
ib
u
ti
o
n
s
p
er
m
it
te
d
w
it
h
15
þ
ye
ar
s
o
f
se
rv
ic
e
(C
on
ti
n
u
ed
)
T
a
b
le
3-
1
C
on
ti
n
u
ed
.
IR
C
§4
0
8
,
4
0
8
A
IR
A
s
N
on
-q
u
al
if
ie
d
de
fe
rr
ed
co
m
pe
n
sa
ti
on
pl
an
s
T
ra
di
ti
on
al
IR
A
R
ot
hI
R
A
SE
P
-I
R
A
SI
M
P
L
E
IR
A
E
li
gi
bl
e
4
5
7
(b
)
pl
an
s
E
xe
cu
ti
ve
A
rr
an
ge
m
en
ts
E
li
gi
b
il
it
y
A
n
yo
n
e
A
n
yo
n
e
w
it
h
ea
rn
in
gs
le
ss
th
an
$1
10
,0
00
fo
r
in
d
iv
id
u
al
s
an
d
$1
60
,0
00
fo
r
co
u
p
le
se
A
n
y
em
p
lo
ye
r
E
m
p
lo
ye
es
o
f
em
p
lo
ye
rs
w
it
h
n
o
o
th
er
p
la
n
an
d
<
10
0
em
p
lo
ye
es
E
m
p
lo
ye
es
o
f
st
at
e
an
d
lo
ca
l
go
ve
rn
m
en
t
an
d
ta
x-
ex
em
p
t
o
rg
an
iz
at
io
n
s
Se
le
ct
gr
o
u
p
o
f
o
ff
ic
er
s
o
r
h
ig
h
ly
co
m
p
en
sa
te
d
em
p
lo
ye
es
D
o
ll
ar
li
m
it
o
n
co
n
tr
ib
u
ti
o
n
s
$3
,0
00
*
fo
r
al
l
IR
A
s
þ
$5
00
*
ca
tc
h
-u
p
co
n
tr
ib
u
ti
o
n
s;
co
n
tr
ib
u
ti
o
n
s
ar
e
fu
ll
y
d
ed
u
ct
ib
le
if
th
er
e
is
n
o
em
p
lo
ye
r
p
la
n
o
r
in
co
m
e
is
le
ss
th
an
$4
5,
00
0
fo
r
in
d
iv
id
u
al
s
an
d
$6
5,
00
0
fo
r
co
u
p
le
sf
$3
,0
00
*
fo
r
al
l
IR
A
s
þ
$5
00
*
ca
tc
h
-u
p
co
n
tr
ib
u
ti
o
n
s
L
es
se
r
o
f
$4
1,
00
0*
o
r
25
%
o
f
p
ay
A
m
o
u
n
t
o
f
em
p
lo
ye
e
an
d
em
p
lo
ye
r
co
n
tr
ib
u
ti
o
n
s
$1
3,
00
0*
þ
$3
,0
00
*
ca
tc
h
-u
p
co
n
tr
ib
u
ti
o
n
s
N
o
n
e
M
ax
im
u
m
p
er
ce
n
t
o
f
p
ay
li
m
it
o
n
co
n
tr
ib
u
ti
o
n
s
10
0%
10
0%
25
%
N
o
t
ap
p
li
ca
b
le
10
0%
N
o
n
e
E
m
p
lo
ye
r
co
n
tr
ib
u
ti
o
n
li
m
it
s
N
o
t
ap
p
li
ca
b
le
L
es
se
r
o
f
$4
1,
00
0*
o
r
25
%
o
f
p
ay
M
at
ch
in
g
co
n
tr
ib
u
ti
o
n
o
f
u
p
to
3%
o
fp
ay
o
r
fi
xe
d
co
n
tr
ib
u
ti
o
n
o
f
2%
o
f
p
ay
N
o
n
e
E
m
p
lo
ye
e
co
n
tr
ib
u
ti
o
n
li
m
it
s
$3
,0
00
*
þ
$5
00
*
ca
tc
h
-u
p
co
n
tr
ib
u
ti
o
n
s
$3
,0
00
*
þ
$5
00
*
ca
tc
h
-u
p
co
n
tr
ib
u
ti
o
n
s
N
o
t
ap
p
li
ca
b
le
$9
,0
00
*
þ
$1
,5
00
*
ca
tc
h
-u
p
co
n
tr
ib
u
ti
o
n
s
L
es
se
r
o
f
$1
3,
00
0*
þ
$3
,0
00
*
ca
tc
h
-u
p
co
n
tr
ib
u
ti
o
n
s
o
r
10
0%
o
f
p
ay
N
o
n
e
E
m
p
lo
ye
r
d
ed
u
ct
io
n
li
m
it
s
N
o
t
ap
p
li
ca
b
le
25
%
o
f
ag
gr
eg
at
e
p
ay
A
m
o
u
n
t
o
f
co
n
tr
ib
u
ti
o
n
s
N
o
t
ap
p
li
ca
b
le
N
o
n
e
E
x
cl
u
si
o
n
fr
o
m
S
S
ta
x
N
o
t
fo
r
co
n
tr
ib
u
ti
o
n
s
b
u
t
d
is
tr
ib
u
ti
o
n
s
q
u
al
if
y
B
o
th
co
n
tr
ib
u
ti
o
n
s
an
d
d
is
tr
ib
u
ti
o
n
s
N
o
t
fo
r
em
p
lo
ye
e
co
n
tr
ib
u
ti
o
n
s
b
u
t
em
p
lo
ye
r
co
n
tr
ib
u
ti
o
n
s
an
d
d
is
tr
ib
u
ti
o
n
s
q
u
al
if
y
N
o
t
fo
r
em
p
lo
ye
e
co
n
tr
ib
u
ti
o
n
s
b
u
t
d
is
tr
ib
u
ti
o
n
s
q
u
al
if
y
D
ep
en
d
s
o
n
ve
st
in
g
1
0
%
E
ar
ly
w
it
h
d
ra
w
al
ta
x
Ye
s
U
su
al
ly
n
o
t
Ye
s
Ye
s,
in
cr
ea
se
d
to
25
%
in
1s
t
2
ye
ar
s
N
o
t
ap
p
li
ca
b
le
N
o
(u
n
le
ss
an
n
u
it
y
p
u
rc
h
as
ed
)
E
ar
ly
w
it
h
d
ra
w
al
ta
x
ex
ce
p
ti
o
n
s
M
ed
ic
al
,
1s
t
h
o
m
e-
p
u
rc
h
as
e,
h
ig
h
er
ed
u
ca
ti
o
n
ex
p
en
se
s,
h
ea
lt
h
in
su
ra
n
ce
p
ay
m
en
ts
fo
r
u
n
em
p
lo
ye
d
A
ge
59
1 ⁄ 2
,
d
ea
th
,
d
is
ab
il
it
y,
1s
t
h
o
m
e
p
u
rc
h
as
e
Sa
m
e
as
tr
ad
it
io
n
al
IR
A
Sa
m
e
as
tr
ad
it
io
n
al
IR
A
N
o
t
ap
p
li
ca
b
le
N
o
n
e
(u
n
le
ss
an
n
u
it
y
p
u
rc
h
as
ed
)
W
it
h
d
ra
w
al
s
p
er
m
it
te
d
Ye
s,
m
ay
b
e
su
b
je
ct
to
ex
ci
se
ta
x
5-
ye
ar
w
ai
ti
n
g
p
er
io
d
Ye
s
U
n
fo
re
se
ea
b
le
em
er
ge
n
cy
o
n
ly
w
h
il
e
em
p
lo
ye
d
Ye
s
L
o
an
s
av
ai
la
b
le
N
o
U
n
cl
ea
r
Ye
s
N
o
n
d
is
cr
im
in
at
io
n
ru
le
s
N
o
n
e
N
o
n
e
U
n
if
o
rm
p
er
ce
n
t
o
f
p
ay
co
n
tr
ib
u
ti
o
n
;
to
p
-h
ea
vy
ru
le
s
R
eq
u
ir
ed
em
p
lo
ye
r
co
n
tr
ib
u
ti
o
n
o
n
ly
N
o
n
e
N
o
n
e
P
ay
li
m
it
Se
e
ab
o
ve
$2
05
,0
00
*
$2
05
,0
00
*
fo
r
2%
o
f
p
ay
co
n
tr
ib
u
ti
o
n
$2
05
,0
00
*
N
o
t
ap
p
li
ca
b
le
In
te
gr
at
ed
w
it
h
so
ci
al
se
cu
ri
ty
N
o
M
ay
b
e
N
o
N
o
t
ap
p
li
ca
b
le
S
p
o
u
sa
l
p
ro
te
ct
io
n
N
o
n
e
u
n
d
er
fe
d
er
al
la
w
,
m
ay
b
e
av
ai
la
b
le
u
n
d
er
st
at
e
la
w
V
es
ti
n
g
Im
m
ed
ia
te
U
su
al
ly
d
ef
er
re
d
(C
on
ti
n
u
ed
)
T
a
b
le
3-
1
C
on
ti
n
u
ed
.
IR
C
§4
0
8
,
4
0
8
A
IR
A
s
N
on
-q
u
al
if
ie
d
de
fe
rr
ed
co
m
pe
n
sa
ti
on
pl
an
s
T
ra
di
ti
on
al
IR
A
R
ot
h
IR
A
SE
P
-I
R
A
SI
M
P
L
E
IR
A
E
li
gi
bl
e
4
5
7
(b
)
pl
an
s
E
xe
cu
ti
ve
A
rr
an
ge
m
en
ts
S
p
ec
ia
l
re
st
ri
ct
io
n
s
an
d
b
en
ef
it
s
N
o
n
e
A
ft
er
-t
ax
co
n
tr
ib
u
ti
o
n
s;
n
o
ta
x
o
n
d
is
tr
ib
u
ti
o
n
s
E
m
p
lo
ye
r
d
o
es
n
o
t
h
av
e
to
co
n
tr
ib
u
te
ev
er
y
ye
ar
E
m
p
lo
ye
es
ar
e
ge
n
er
al
ly
re
sp
o
n
si
b
le
fo
r
in
ve
st
m
en
ts
Sp
ec
ia
l
d
o
u
b
le
ca
tc
h
-
u
p
co
n
tr
ib
u
ti
o
n
s
av
ai
la
b
le
d
u
ri
n
g
th
e
3
ye
ar
s
b
ef
o
re
re
ti
re
m
en
t;
p
la
n
s
ar
e
te
ch
n
ic
al
ly
u
n
fu
n
d
ed
b
u
t
co
n
tr
ib
u
ti
o
n
s
to
p
u
b
li
c
se
ct
o
r
p
la
n
s
m
u
st
b
e
h
el
d
in
tr
u
st
E
m
p
lo
ye
e
ta
xe
d
w
h
en
b
en
ef
it
s
ar
e
p
ai
d
o
r
m
ad
e
av
ai
la
b
le
(o
r
w
h
en
ve
st
ed
fo
r
ta
x-
ex
em
p
ts
);
m
ay
b
e
a
D
C
o
r
D
B
p
la
n
*m
ea
n
s
th
e
am
o
u
n
t
is
su
b
je
ct
to
ad
ju
st
m
en
t
fo
r
in
fl
at
io
n
o
r
th
ro
u
gh
a
sc
h
ed
u
le
d
in
cr
e a
se
.
So
u
rc
e:
IR
C
§§
21
9,
40
1(
a)
,
40
1(
k)
,
40
1(
m
),
40
2,
40
3,
40
4,
40
8,
40
8A
,
40
9,
41
0,
41
1,
41
2,
41
4,
41
5
an
d
41
6
an
d
th
ei
r
re
gu
la
ti
o
n
s.
a
T
h
e
$4
1,
00
0
o
ve
ra
ll
li
m
it
is
a
cu
m
u
la
ti
ve
li
m
it
fo
r
an
em
p
lo
ye
e
ac
ro
ss
al
l
d
ef
in
ed
co
n
tr
ib
u
ti
o
n
p
la
n
s
o
f
th
e
sa
m
e
em
p
lo
ye
r.
b
F
in
an
ci
al
h
ar
d
sh
ip
is
an
im
m
ed
ia
te
an
d
h
ea
vy
fi
n
an
ci
al
n
ee
d
,
ev
en
if
fo
re
se
ea
b
le
o
r
vo
lu
n
ta
ri
ly
in
cu
rr
ed
,
n
o
t
ab
le
to
b
e
sa
ti
sf
ie
d
b
y
o
th
er
re
so
u
rc
es
.
c
B
o
th
th
e
A
ct
u
al
D
ef
er
ra
l
P
er
ce
n
ta
ge
(A
D
P
)
te
st
fo
r
40
1(
k)
co
n
tr
ib
u
ti
o
n
s
an
d
th
e
A
ve
ra
ge
C
o
n
tr
ib
u
ti
o
n
P
er
ce
n
ta
ge
(A
C
P
)
te
st
fo
r
m
at
ch
in
g
an
d
af
te
r-
ta
x
co
n
tr
ib
u
ti
o
n
s
ar
e
d
es
ig
n
ed
to
li
m
it
co
n
tr
ib
u
ti
o
n
s
m
ad
e
b
y
H
C
E
s
to
a
p
ro
p
o
rt
io
n
b
as
ed
o
n
th
e
av
er
ag
e
co
n
tr
ib
u
ti
o
n
s
m
ad
e
b
y
N
H
C
E
s.
d
T
h
e
su
rv
iv
in
g
sp
o
u
se
re
ce
iv
es
th
e
ac
co
u
n
t
b
al
an
ce
as
a
d
ea
th
b
en
ef
it
u
n
le
ss
h
e/
sh
e
h
as
co
n
se
n
te
d
to
an
o
th
er
b
en
ef
ic
ia
ry
b
ei
n
g
n
am
ed
.
e
T
h
e
in
co
m
e
p
h
as
e-
o
u
t
sc
h
ed
u
le
fo
r
R
o
th
IR
A
s
is
$9
5,
00
0–
11
0,
00
0
fo
r
in
d
iv
id
u
al
s
an
d
$1
50
,0
00
–1
60
,0
00
fo
r
m
ar
ri
ed
co
u
p
le
s
fi
li
n
g
jo
in
tl
y.
f
IR
A
in
co
m
e
p
h
as
e-
o
u
t
sc
h
ed
u
le
in
20
04
:
$4
5,
00
0–
55
,0
00
fo
r
in
d
iv
id
u
al
s
an
d
$6
5,
00
0–
75
,0
00
fo
r
m
ar
ri
ed
co
u
p
le
s
fi
li
n
g
to
ge
th
er
.
T
h
es
e
p
h
as
e-
o
u
ts
ar
e
sc
h
ed
u
le
d
to
in
cr
ea
se
to
$5
0,
00
0–
60
,0
00
fo
r
in
d
iv
id
u
al
s
an
d
$8
0,
00
0–
10
0,
00
0
fo
r
jo
in
t
fi
le
rs
b
y
20
07
.
T
h
er
e
ar
e
al
so
sp
ec
ia
l
li
m
it
s
fo
r
n
o
n
w
o
rk
in
g
sp
o
u
se
.
For example, it is often not readily apparent in any given situation which
plan might be the ‘best’ alternative among those available. Numerous con-
sultants and other pension professionals assist in the plan selection and
design process, but their services inevitably increase the cost of plan spon-
sorship and membership. Moreover, as rules grow more complicated, the
administrative burden on plan sponsors whose plans must satisfy all relevant
rules or lose their tax benefits also increases. The private pension system now
includes a plan compliance industry, composed of lawyers, consultants,
actuaries, accountants, and other pension professionals, dedicated to mas-
tering and implementing plan rules. Their services are often critical to
insure that plans satisfy the law, but their costs, which can be significant,
must be borne by the employer as an additional business expense or charged
to plan participants where they reduce the return to savings.
To be fair, it must be acknowledged that EGTTRA has resulted in some
long overdue and welcome changes. For example, it rationalized the con-
tribution limits on most employee savings plans today, 401(k), 403(b) and
457(b) plans, and the employer deduction limits on most plan types. It also
eliminated some anomalies, such as the exclusion allowance for 403(b)
arrangements and the coordinated contribution limit for 457(b) plans. It
will result in one less plan type to worry about; by increasing the deduction
limits for profit-sharing plans to those of money purchase plans; the latter
(which are slightly less flexible) will become extinct. But, of course, most
plan types continue to operate and the private pension system must now
absorb and digest the changes EGTTRA has made in pension law.
The type of reform represented by EGTTRA and its predecessors have
generally left the private pension system with more rules, not fewer; more
plan types, not fewer; and more choices, even though many are not mean-
ingful or worthwhile if and when understood. Only in a very few cases, such
as the repeal of special contribution limits for 403(b) arrangements, did
some rules actually disappear. In most cases, new rules are just placed on
top of old rules, and new regulations must be written to harmonize and
integrate them with existing law. Moreover, the private pension system has
not yet felt the full brunt of EGTTRA. Rules permitting IRA contributions
to employer-based plans recently became effective, and in 2006, some plans
will be allowed to provide eternal tax forgiveness of future returns as long as
no upfront deduction is taken, essentially by permitting the Roth-type
contributions available already for Roth IRAs.
Given this background, not all of EGTTRA’s changes are as benign
as they might first appear. Allowing IRA contributions to be made to
employer-based plans (thereby letting employees make these contributions
directly to their employer’s plan rather than to a separately maintained
IRA) might be viewed as a good idea. Dodging the budgetary implications
of backloading the cost of tax preferences to future years, allowing Roth-
type contributions to employee savings plans (e.g. Roth 401(k)’s in 2006)
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might also be viewed as worthwhile in isolation as a pension policy. From a
legal perspective, however, these additions compound the complexity now
found in the private pension system. IRA contributions to qualified plans
(‘deemed IRAs’) bring with them their special rules that will be added to
plans already overwhelmed with their own rules. A plan that fails to observe
the IRA rules may jeopardize the tax-qualified status of the entire plan
while a plan that violates tax-qualification requirements may cost its IRAs
their tax benefits too. Roth contributions too make employer-plans more
complicated. Employees have traditionally made contributions on a pre-tax
basis through which contributions (and their earnings) are taxed only
when distributed from the plan or on an after-tax basis in which contribu-
tions are made from already-taxed income and only earnings are taxed
when distributed. Roth contributions are based on a completely different
tax system in which contributions are made from after-tax income but are
completely exempt from taxation thereafter. Adding Roth contributions
therefore means layering a third tax system on top of the traditional pre-tax
and after-tax regimes. Employers will have to observe all the separate
vesting rules, separate distribution rules, and separate record keeping,
tax reporting and accounting requirements that apply to these different
types of contributions and tax regimes in their plans. The ultimate effect of
even the best-intentioned changes brought about by EGTTRA is more, not
less, legal complexity in the private pension system and more, not less, of a
compliance burden for employers.
Maintaining the Status Quo: The Pension Preservation
and Savings Expansion Act of 2003
According to its sponsors, the PPSEA, makes ‘the next generation of
improvements to our nation’s savings and pension systems’ by providing
‘a number of important new savings tools,’ strengthening and expanding
the employer-sponsored retirement system, offering ‘new protections to
participants’ and ‘assisting retirees in managing and preserving retirement
assets and income’(Portman and Cardin 2003a). It is a massive bill, with
more than 200 pages and 16 lengthy sections of highly technical changes to
employee benefits law.1
PPSEA follows in the footsteps of EGTTRA and was crafted as a follow-on
bill by EGTTRA’s primary drafters, US Representatives Rob Portman of
Ohio and Benjamin Cardin of Maryland. Its initial thrust was to accelerate
and make permanent the changes in EGTTRA that would have expired in
2010 unless extended by Congress. Its immediate effect would be to in-
crease the amounts individuals could contribute to 401(k)-type plans and
IRAs. The bill then winds its way through almost every aspect of the private
pension system, proposing changes, additions, and deletions to current
rules along the way. If PPSEA were to be enacted, major legal rules
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throughout the pension system will be changed. These include rules on
when employees are vested in plan benefits, when plans become tax-quali-
fied, how DB formulas can calculate pension, and when employees must
begin receiving benefits.
In addition to rule changes, there are, as always, changes to plan types.
This time, the focus is on the SIMPLE plans created in 1996 that were based
on plan designs intended to minimize the regulatory burden of sponsoring
a plan for small employers. When SIMPLE plans were enacted, employers
were no longer permitted to create new Salary Reduction Simplified
Employee Pension Plans (SARSEPs), plans that could be restricted to
employee, 401(k)-type contributions. SIMPLE plans required employers
instead to make at least a minimal plan contribution in exchange for fewer
rules and less liability. PPSEA proposes to weaken the effect of these
reforms by bringing back SARSEP-type plans and permitting a smaller
employer contribution. Employers would have more choices but the design
of SIMPLE plans would become more complicated and, in the end, not
very different from their traditional counterparts.
Not one of these changes, standing alone, is particularly problematic,
and many are in fact improvements in current rules. But perhaps this is not
the appropriate standard for evaluating PPSEA. The important question is
not whether it does some good for some people, but rather whether it helps
move the private pension system toward the systematic improvement it
needs to meet the retirement income challenges to come and whether it
makes the best use of the resources that are spent. A more general question
is why the private pension system seems to need major reconstructive
surgery every year or so. After every extensive legal revision, it usually
takes about five years before the necessary regulatory guidance to imple-
ment the new rules is available. Too frequent changes leave plans in legal
limbo and the system in regulatory gridlock.
PPSEA tinkers with many current rules and adds new ones but does little
to change the basic architecture of the private pension system. For ex-
ample, there will still be eight different ways for employees to save their
own money, depending on what type of employer they have and the plan it
chooses to sponsor, if any: a 401(k) plan for corporate and nonprofit
employers, a 403(b) arrangement for nonprofit and public employers, a
457(b) plan for nonprofit and public employers, a SIMPLE plan based on a
401(k) model, a SIMPLE plan based on an IRA, a traditional IRA, a Roth
IRA, or a SARSEP. For employers, distinguishing 401(k) plans from 403(b)
arrangements from 457(b) plans from SIMPLE plans will be difficult,
because they will outwardly look so much alike. Employees, too, often
find the intricate rules for saving perplexing. When navigating the private
pension system, employers and employees are confronted with choices that
appear similar but can have very different legal consequences, and this, as
lawyers often say, can and will be a trap for the unwary.
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EGTTRA and PPSEA exemplify the customary approach to reform in the
US private pension system. For the most part, they maintain the status quo
and preserve the historically distinct plan types based on employer tax
attributes and their rules. At the same time, they create new plan types
and tax regimes that do not fit neatly into the traditional structure. Over
time, the traditional structure makes less sense and becomes less capable of
supporting such changes; systemic reform is warranted but never achieved.
Instead, plan types continue to be haphazardly combined, and their rules
are layered on top of each other, along with the many special rules and
exceptions and transition rules and historical legal quirks required to
maintain the legal integrity of the system. The consequence is an all too
complex and intricate private pension system.
One consequence of this approach is, frequent mutations of pension law
that increase the compliance burden of employers as well as the costs of
sponsoring a plan. On the positive side, it may provide employers and
employees with more choices. Then again, while more choice is usually
good, too many unnecessary choices may not be desirable especially if, over
time, they are not sustainable. For example, adding Roth contributions will
increase the complexity and cost of plan administration for employers and
be a likely source of confusion for employees (Vanguard Center for Retire-
ment Research 2001). Not only do Roth contributions require employees
to project future earnings, tax rates, and statutory changes to tax law when
deciding about contributing, but the tax consequences of their choice will
determine pension and budget policy in part for decades to come. There is
no guarantee, moreover, that Roth contributions will always have the
favorable tax treatment they now enjoy. Employees, even assuming they
can make a perfectly rational choice between the alternative tax regimes,
may find that new tax laws (e.g. higher rates, lower rates, adoption of a
consumption tax) means that the government reneged on what it once
offered. It is one thing to change the law; it is another to give people
choices, and then change the rules under which those past choices were
made. And when eligibility for future Medicare, Medicaid, and other
income-related benefits are determined, ‘income’ from Roth IRAs and
401(k)s probably will be counted, meaning that employees will have to
maintain mini-accounting systems just for Roth contributions, even though
they do not need to be reported for income tax purposes.
Ultimately, the question arises: Who really benefits from PPSEA and the
type of change it represents? It certainly means more work for the lawyers,
actuaries, consultants, and accountants in the plan compliance industry.
New regulations must be drafted, plans must be rewritten and requalified,
and administrative procedures must be reprogrammed. PPSEA also means
more assets of higher-income individuals will need to flow through an extra
layer of retirement plan management, thus increasing the fees paid to
financial services, mutual fund, and insurance companies relative to other
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saving. It means that wealthier Americans can get more tax benefits from
savings plans sooner because of higher contribution limits and liberalized
withdrawal rules. Further, there are many special rules and provisions for
almost every large group with an interest in pensions. But it is difficult to
argue that it is constructive for the ordinary pension consumer—the not-so-
large employer and the not-so-wealthy employee—from whom the higher
costs of management attributable to the added complexity will take a much
larger share of savings. For many of them, net rates of return are likely to
decline. Neither have its economic benefits been demonstrated; there is no
evidence (and no one has attempted to estimate) that PPSEA would result
in any increase in the percent of low-and middle-income workers who reach
retirement with perhaps more than $100,000 in assets.
An Alternative Direction for Private Pensions?
Simplified Savings Accounts
In 2003, the Bush Administration stunned the employee benefits commu-
nity by proposing a radical pruning of employer-sponsored savings plans. It
advocated replacing the panoply of 401(k) plans, 457(b) plans, SIMPLE
401(k) plans, 403(b) arrangements, SEPs and SIMPLE IRAs with a new,
standard plan type called Employer Retirement Savings Account or (ERSA).
Although ERSAs look similar to today’s 401(k) plan, contributions would
not be made from pre-tax income. Instead, all contributions would be Roth
contributions, made from after-tax income and exempt from taxation
thereafter. Traditional and Roth IRAs would also be combined into a
type of plan called a Retirement Savings Account or RSAs, modeled on
today’s Roth IRAs, would replace individual IRAs, and a new savings ar-
rangement called a Lifetime Savings Account or LSAs would be created for
general purpose saving.2 LSAs are also modeled on Roth IRAs, but would
have fewer rules and restrictions than either ERSAs or RSAs. In 2004, the
proposal was expanded to include a fourth type of savings plan, individual
development accounts (IDAs), intended for low-income workers.
The Administration’s proposals were widely criticized; many felt that
RSAs and LSAs were too generous to higher-income taxpayers who could
arbitrage the tax system and generate tax saving with little or no increase in
personal saving (Steuerle 2003). Others felt that these would destabilize
the private pension system, because employers, particularly small business
owners, would trade in their broad-based plans for personal RSAs and LSAs
for themselves and their families. Some suggested that employees
also might abandon their employer-based plans and worried that (Profit-
Sharing/401(k) Council of America 2003):
Some moderate and lower income employees will make smaller, or no, contribu-
tions to LSAs and RSAs than they and their employers would have made to their
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qualified plans. Many employees will redirect their retirement savings to LSAs and
use their accumulations for nonretirement purposes. To the extent that some
employers continue to offer 401(k) plans, it may be more difficult for these plans
to pass the nondiscrimination tests, even as changed in the proposal. Many employ-
ees offered a 401(k) will choose instead to save in LSAs, where they will have
immediate and unrestricted access to their savings.
The plan compliance industry was distressed that it had not been consulted
and the proposals were developed without their knowledge or cooperation.
As a result, the proposals failed to find supporters or receive serious
consideration.
Yet the following year, ERSAs, RSAs, and LSAs again returned to the
policy arena, and this time, the Administration actively worked with the
plan compliance industry. The most recent proposals retained some of
the beneficial simplification features of the 2003 design but there were also
some significant differences. Table 3-2 illustrates the major design features
of each plan as currently proposed and indicates important rule changes
from the 2003 proposals.
One change was that RSAs and LSAs were made modestly less attractive
by reducing annual contribution limits by one-third, from $7,500 to $5,000
annually. Otherwise, the accounts were little changed: RSAs and LSAs are
still essentially Roth-IRAs, funded with after-tax contributions and largely
exempt from tax thereafter. In an effort to provide a balance for RSAs and
LSAs that would benefit those at the high end of the income scale, the
Administration added something for those at the low end—an expansion
of the still-experimental IDAs. Low-income savers could contribute to an
IDA and receive a 100 percent match of up to $500 annually. Matching
contributions would come indirectly from the government through private
financial institutions (not employers) that would receive a 100 percent tax
credit in return for providing the match initially. Account assets would be
available to pay for higher education, first-time home purchases, and small
business capitalization.
ERSAs too were changed in the 2004 round. Figure 3-2 illustrates how
ERSAs would reduce the current hodgepodge of savings plans—the 401(k)
plans; the 403(b) arrangements; the 457(b) plans; the SIMPLE IRAs; the
SARSEPs, and the SIMPLE 401(k)s—that now clutter the private pension
system, to a single, standard plan. All 401(k) plans would become ERSAs,
and all other plans could become ERSAs; those that did not would be
frozen as of 2005. ERSAs could also include RSAs, subject to RSA rules.
This new direction proposed for the US private pension system, based on
simplified savings accounts, has some significant merits that have largely
been lost in the controversy over RSAs and LSAs. First, ERSAs would help
rationalize and modernize the private pension system by eliminating some
archaic, duplicate plan types. Second, they would simplify and standardize
further, the rules for employee saving and thereby, reduce the burden and
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costs of plan administration. Although a single plan for employee saving
makes sense, the new proposal does not go as far as it could from a design
perspective. It preserves the anachronism that some separate rules are
required for different type of employers, even though ERSAs are primarily
designed for employee saving. There are drawbacks from a tax perspective
as well, notably the Roth-type accounts. They push all costs into the future,
often for decades; they add significant complication for both planning and
administration when withdrawals from traditional DB plans receive more
traditional tax treatment; they disfavor middle-income employees who are
likely to retire and move into lower tax brackets (for whom the traditional
tax treatment is better); and, as noted above, other government programs
are inevitably going to require income accounting for supposedly nontax-
able Roth contribution income anyway.
In addition, while the 2004 ERSAs look much like the 2003 version, they
lack many of the features with the most promise for simplifying pension
law. Most plans currently must perform complicated tests against the
nondiscrimination rules, to prove that they are not providing high-paid
employees with excessive benefits. Last year’s proposal greatly simplified
those rules by providing standard definitions of key concepts and less-
complicated testing procedures. It minimized the special nondiscrimina-
tion rules that 401(k) plans must pass every year to maintain a balance
between contributions by high-paid and low-paid employees. It also dis-
pensed with the top-heavy rules that come into play when plan benefits
favor company owners and executives and the procedures employers can
now use to shift a higher proportion of plan benefits to the high-paid such
as Social Security integration and cross-testing.
The 2003 proposal promised to take the US pension system in a new
direction. Through a radical pruning of plan types and their anachronistic
rules, it seemed to herald a turning point in design that would reduce
the administrative burden on employers and the cost of sponsoring plans.
The 2004 proposal had a more limited vision. For example, the 2003
proposal retained the current nondiscrimination standard that qualified
plans could not be designed or operated to favor high-paid employees but
suggested simplified tests for measuring discrimination. The simplification
it proposed seemed even-handed for both low- and high-paid employees.
Each won and lost a little relative to the current rules but, on balance,
neither seemed particularly disadvantaged by the proposed changes. By
contrast, the 2004 proposal kept alive today’s version of the nondiscrimina-
tion rules, that massive tangle of pseudomathematical rules, regulations,
testing procedures, and special exceptions, that most qualified plans must
satisfy every year. By doing so, it retained such rules as Social Security
integration and cross-testing that enable employers to shift more contribu-
tions and benefits to high-paid employees. At the same time, ERSAs in
2004 offered nothing new for low-paid employees but were likely to enable
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high-paid employees to contribute even more than they could under
current law.
Sketching a Compromise
Although it did not pass in 2003, PPSEA seems more destined for legislative
passage, since it represents a traditional approach to reform and is there-
fore less controversial as it makes no fundamental change to the status quo.
Moreover, almost every special interest group in the retirement benefit
field has a desired provision in it, and the muscle of employee benefits and
financial service trade associations is behind it. Budgetary constraints,
however, may prevent or slow its passage. PPSEA, like EGTTRA, was
designed in the unique 1997–2003 budget period, where almost every
major tax or expenditure bill included giveaways but little or no attention
was paid to financing the changes.
At the same time, however, the Bush Administration’s ERSA/RSA/LSA
type of proposal has a support base. Although its design was initially viewed
as too radical, the 2004 changes brought the plan closer to the mainstream
and increased its appeal, though this may have eroded its potential for real
change. In reality, the Administration’s proposal was never as radical as it
first appeared, but the new changes made it even less so. For example, the
design of ERSAs seemed appealing for its simplicity, but it could have been
improved without adding too much complexity. The 2004 changes not only
failed to simplify coverage and nondiscrimination standards that keep low-
paid workers from being left behind or left out, they generally were in the
opposite direction.
The 2004 proposal also retained several other design flaws. For example,
the Administration proposed to create different ERSAs for different types
of employers. Keeping special rules for tax-exempt and governmental
employers is an anachronism; the tax attributes of employers have no
relevance for plans designed for employee savings, especially now that
employee-funded plans are the primary, and often the only, source of
retirement income for millions of workers. An employee who works for a
corporation should have the same opportunity to save as an employee at a
state government. A high-paid employee of a tax-exempt hospital should
have no greater or lesser chance to save than a corporate employee with the
same income. A related issue was the failure to design ERSAs with more
incentives for savings by low-paid employees. Today’s 401(k) plans, for
example, have special provisions designed to increase retirement saving
by low-paid employees that seem to have succeeded, so there is a argument
for applying them to plans of tax-exempt and state government employers
too. Another crucial reform to the ERSA proposal is to eliminate all
opportunities for Roth-type contributions. As noted, they represent sub-
stantial complexity in figuring out what type of account to open, they are all
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back-loaded in costs and represent poor budget policy, and they add to
complexity, with only one piece of that complexity related to the potential
for conversions over time.
In Figure 3-3 we present a compromise proposal for revising ERSAs, one
we first broached when ERISA turned 25. At that time it did not seem
feasible in the near term, but, thanks to Economic Growth and Tax Relief
Reconciliation Act of 2001 (EGTRRA) and the Administration’s proposal, it
no longer seems out of the realm of possibility. Like the Administration’s
proposal, it calls for a single, simple DC plan for employee saving, to replace
the many varieties available today. It also calls for uniform contribution and
deduction limits and rules on portability that have largely been achieved—
thanks to EGTRRA. It provides further simplification by proposing uniform
Social Security treatment for contributions, and, it ignores the tax attributes
of employers when designing rules to promote employee saving.
This design also avoids the issue over which the Administration’s pro-
posal stumbled, namely overly generous individual saving vehicles which
compete with employer plans, by having an individual, coordinated limit
US pension and saving system
Defined benefit plans
Coordinate normal retirement age 
with Social Security
Reduce early retirement subsidies
Reduce late retirement penalties
Provide incentives for part-time 
work and phased retirement for
Reduce disincentives for post-normal
retirement age work
Provide a minimum portable
       benefit for short-term workers
Permit employees to purchase a 
larger benefit or additional 
years of service
Defined contribution plans
Standard plan for all employers
Uniform eligibility standard
Standard rules for withdrawals
Standard rules for portability
Standard deduction and 
contribution limits
Same Social Security tax treatment
for employer and employee 
contributions
Individual
retirement
accounts
Federal matching contributions for
low and moderate income workers
Coordinated limit on
employee contributions
older workers
Figure 3-3. An alternative structure for the US private pension system.
Source : Perun and Steuerle (2002).
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on saving between individual and employer-sponsored vehicles. This will
not solve the coverage problem by itself; that is, there will still be many
smaller employers who will find the current IRA limits an attractive alter-
native to sponsoring a plan. But, unlike the Administration’s RSA proposal,
the coordinated limit will keep this plan from becoming the Trojan horse
of the private pension system.
Finally, this model recognizes that more needs to be done to make a tax-
based system an effective saving tool for low-paid workers. It is unclear why
major reform should be enacted, unless it promises to expand participa-
tion in the private pension system, so this alternative plan recommends
government matching contributions for low and moderate-income workers
just for that purpose. The fiscal realities facing the federal government
today are very different, but three years ago EGTRRA created a tax credit
for low-income savers that PPSEA now proposes to make available to
higher-paid workers. It makes more sense to make EGTTRA’s credits
refundable, which would help the majority of low-income savers who have
no tax liability and provide an incentive to save that is similar to matching
contributions. This issue involves more than fairness. Those with little
saving currently are the ones least likely to be able merely to transfer
money out of one account into a subsidized retirement account. Thus
government subsidies might be more likely to increase national saving as
well, if they were less directed to those able to obtain the benefits of the
private pension system without contributing any additional net saving.
Conclusions
The challenges facing the US pension system are well recognized. Despite
large budgetary costs, the current structure does not provide substantial
benefits for a very large portion of new retirees, particularly those who have
had average or below-average earnings. Accordingly, Congress, and the
country, is at a crossroads. Legislators can either decide to maintain the
status quo, or they can strike out in a new direction.
Maintaining the status quo may seem the safer choice and may be the
path chosen. Yet bolder action may be warranted. One approach, repre-
sented by the Administration’s 2003 and 2004 proposals for ERSAs, LSAs,
and RSAs, moves the private pension system toward a more efficient struc-
ture. The effectiveness of this design for increasing saving and plan partici-
pation, as well as its effect on the long-term budgetary situation, is open to
question. An alternative model for restructuring the US private pension
system takes some good ideas, along with the best elements of EGTRRA,
PPSEA, and the Administration’s proposals, and repackages them. At the
same time, the appeal of a simple, standard, universal savings plan is that it
avoids both the mind-numbing complexity of PPSEA and the budgetary
costs and distributional effects of the Administration’s proposal. In sum,
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the private pension system does not necessarily need more saving tools, but
rather it needs to put them to work more effectively. This is the critical first
step towards reinventing the pension component of the new retirement
paradigm.
Glossary
401(a). IRC § 401(a), the federal tax statute containing the basic requirements for
qualified DB and DC pension plans under US law.
401(k). IRC § 401(k), the federal tax statute containing the special requirements
for a ‘cash-or-deferred’ savings arrangement that enables employees to save for
retirement on a pre-tax basis when contributing to their employer’s DC plan.
401(k) plan. A component of a qualified DC plan based on IRC § 401(k) that
permits pre-tax contributions by employees. A 401(k) plan is a qualified plan.
403(b). IRC § 403(b), the federal tax statute containing the primary requirements
for tax-deferred DC arrangements available to employees of educational institu-
tions and certain non-profit organizations defined in IRC § 501(c)(3). 403(b)
arrangements may also permit 401(k)-type, pre-tax contributions.
403(b) arrangements. A savings arrangement, also called a tax sheltered annuity,
based on IRC § 403(b) that can permit pre-tax contributions by employees. A
403(b) arrangement is not a qualified plan.
408. IRC § 408, the federal tax statute containing the basic requirements for IRAs
and SIMPLE plans based on IRAs.
408A. IRC § 408A, the federal tax statute containing the basic requirements for
IRAs permitting Roth contributions.
457(b). IRC § 457(b), the federal tax statute containing the basic requirements for
tax-deferred DC plans sponsored by state and local governments and tax-exempt
employers that permit 401(k)-type, pre-tax contributions by employees.
457(b) plan. An employer-sponsored arrangement based on IRC § 457(b) that
permits pre-tax contributions by employees. A 457(b) plan is not a qualified plan.
ACP. Average Contribution Percentage Test, one of the two primary tests for
401(k) plans that impose a ceiling on benefits for high-paid employees relative
to the benefits received by low-paid employees in order to encourage their
participation. The ACP test measures whether the difference between the
amount of employer matching contributions and employee after-tax contribu-
tions, measured as a percentage of pay, made by NHCEs, on average, and by
HCEs, on average, is within the spread permitted by IRC § 401(m).
ADP. Average Deferral Percentage Test, one of the two primary tests for
401(k) plans that imposes a ceiling on benefits for high-paid employees relative
to the benefits received by low-paid employees in order to encourage their
participation. The ADP test measures whether the difference between the
amount of pre-tax contributions, measured as a percentage of pay, made by
NHCEs, on average, and by HCEs, on average, is within the spread permitted
by IRC § 401(k).
After-tax contributions. Employee contributions to an employer-based plan or IRA
that are made from after-tax income so that only earnings are taxed when
distributions are made from the plan.
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Catch-up. Additional contributions permitted to defined contribution plans by
employees who have attained the age of fifty.
Coverage. One of the two primary nondiscrimination tests for qualified plans that
are intended to insure that a plan does not disproportionately favor high-paid
employees. In general, this test measures whether the plan includes a sufficient
number of participants who are NHCEs relative to the number of HCEs that
participate and is defined IRC § 410(b).
Cross-testing. A method of testing a qualified plan for nondiscrimination under
IRC § 401(a)(4) that permits a DB plan to be tested as if it were a DC plan and a
DC plan as if it were a DB plan.
Deemed IRAs. An IRA that is included within a qualified plan, a 403(b) arrange-
ment or a 457(b) plan.
Defined benefit plan. A type of plan that pays retirement benefits, usually for life.
Employees earn benefits under a plan formula usually based upon their pay and
years of employment.
Defined contribution plan. A type of plan that provides an account for each
participant and bases benefits on contributions to that account and its earnings.
EGTTRA. The Economic Growth and Tax Relief Reconciliation Act of 2001, the
most recently-enacted tax legislation to amend employee benefits law signifi-
cantly.
Employee stock ownership plan. A qualified plan that is a DC plan designed to
invest primarily in employer stock, defined in IRC §§ 409 and 4975(e)(7).
ERISA. The Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974, the primary mod-
ern law, including both labor and tax laws that governs most US employee benefit
plans.
ERSA. Employer Retirement Savings Account, proposed by the Administration in
2003 and 2004 as a simplified, uniform replacement plan for 401(k), SIMPLE and
457(b) plans as well as 403(b) arrangements.
HCE. Highly compensated employee, defined in IRC § 414(q), one of the major
concepts in the non-discrimination tests that qualified plans must satisfy. In 2004,
an employee who earns at least $90,000 is an HCE.
IDA. Individual development account, proposed by the Administration in 2004 as a
savings account for low-income individuals.
IRA. Individual retirement account governed by IRC § 408 and originally enacted
as part of ERISA as a DC savings plan for individuals without an employer-based
plan. IRAs now can be found in employer-based plans such as SIMPLE IRAs and
SEPs, and, if the plan permits it, employees may also make contributions to an
IRA through a traditional DC plan. An IRA is not a qualified plan.
IRC. Internal Revenue Code, the body of federal US tax law statutes.
LSA. Lifetime Savings Account, proposed by the Administration in 2003 and 2004
as a new DC account for general purpose saving.
Money purchase plan. A qualified plan that is a DC plan with a fixed contribution
formula.
NHCE. A non-highly compensated employee, defined in IRC § 414(q), one of the
major concepts in the nondiscrimination tests that qualified plans must satisfy. In
2004, an employee who earns less than $90,000 is a NHCE.
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Nondiscrimination rules. The body of rules under 401(a)(4) designed to insure
that qualified plans do not discriminate in favor of highly compensated employ-
ees in their plan benefits or contributions. These rules, coordinated with the
coverage rules, implement the nondiscrimination standard that prohibits a quali-
fied plan from being designed or operated in favor of HCEs.
Nonqualified deferred compensation plan. A retirement plan, usually for execu-
tives, that is not a qualified plan but is often used as a supplement to one. Plan
participants are not taxed on contributions to the plan or accrued benefits until
they are received or available for distribution, at which time employers receive a
deduction for their contributions to the plan.
PBGC. Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation, the federal insurer of DB plans.
PPSEA. The Pension Preservation and Savings Expansion Act of 2003, H. R. 1776,
major pension reform legislation proposed in 2003 by Representatives Rob Port-
man and Benjamin L. Cardin, the primary sponsors of EGTTRA.
Pre-tax contributions. Employee contributions to an employer-based 401(k) plan,
403(b) arrangement, 457(b) plan or to an IRA that are made from pre-tax
income and are not taxed until they (plus earnings) are subsequently distributed
from the plan.
Profit-sharing plan. A qualified plan that is a DC plan with a discretionary contri-
bution formula.
Qualified plan. A DB or DC plan that satisfies the requirements of IRC § 401(a),
and other relevant legal provisions. Under the special tax treatment available to
qualified plans, employers may take an immediate deduction for contributions to
their plans but plan participants are not taxed until they receive benefits from the
plan.
Roth 401(k). A 401(k) plan funded with Roth contributions, rather than with pre-
tax contributions, enacted in EGTTRA and scheduled to begin in 2006.
Roth IRA. An IRA funded through Roth contributions.
Roth contributions. A type of contribution to an IRA, created under IRC § 408A
and named for former Senator William Roth, that is made from after-tax income
and is generally not subject to tax thereafter. Beginning in 2006, 401(k) and
457(b) plans and 403(b) arrangements may permit Roth contributions.
RSA. Retirement Savings Account, proposed by the Administration in 2003 and
2004 as a uniform replacement plan for IRAs and Roth IRAs.
SARSEP. A form of SEP, established before 1997, permitting employees to make
401(k)-type contributions to their employer’s SEP. A SARSEP is not a qualified
plan.
SEP. Simplified Employee Pension Plan, a simplified employer-sponsored plan
based upon IRAs created under IRC § 408(k). A SEP is not a qualified plan.
SIMPLE. Savings Match Incentive Plans for Employees, a simplified employer-
based plan created under either IRC § 401(k) or IRC § 408(k) that has individual
savings accounts to which both employers and employees contribute. A SIMPLE
401(k) is a qualified plan but a SIMPLE IRA is not.
Social Security integration. A safe-harbor exception to the nondiscrimination rules
that permits employers to take Social Security into account when determining
benefits or contributions in a qualified plan, as described in IRC § 401(l).
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Stock bonus plan. A qualified plan that is a DC plan with a discretionary contribu-
tion formula whose benefits are distributable in company stock.
Tax sheltered annuity. Another name for a 403(b) arrangement.
Thrift plan. A form of profit sharing plan that predates 401(k) plans and permits
employee after-tax contributions.
Top-heavy rules. Tests found in IRC § 416 that requires qualified plans to provide
minimum contributions or benefits if high-paid company officers and owners
receive more than 60% of plan benefits or contributions.
Endnotes
1. The provisions of the Pension Preservation and Protection Act of 2003, H.R.
1776, can be found at: http://thomas.loc.gov, last accessed July 5, 2004.
2. Legislation to create Retirement Savings Accounts was introduced into the
House of Representatives on June 25, 2004 as H.R. 4714, and legislation to create
Lifetime Savings Accounts was introduced on March 31, 2004 into the House of
Representatives as H.R. 4078 and the Senate as S. 2263.
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